ABSTRACT System logs and traces contain information that reflects the state of the system and serves as a rich source of knowledge for system monitoring from the application to the kernel layer. Moreover, logging of traces as a tool for monitoring the operation of a cyber-physical system is recommended by most safety standard organizations. However, because the data can be overwhelmingly huge within a short space of time, the use of models that do not rely only on known signatures for online anomaly detection becomes difficult to use due to the challenge of processing such an enormous amount of data at runtime. Hence, most practitioners resort to the use of signature-based tools. In this paper, we introduce an anomaly detection model that uses intra-trace and inter-trace context vectors with long short-term memory networks to overcome the challenge of online anomaly detection in cyber-physical systems. We test the performance of the model with publicly available datasets that reflect the internal and external control flow of an embedded application and our model demonstrates both the effectiveness and robustness in detecting an anomalous sequence in a system call stream.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the Internet of Things (IoT) to the Internet of Everything (IoE), the common denominator is connectivity driven by ubiquitous embedded systems. The goal of these devices and infrastructures is to build a cyber-physical framework that predicts and automates the mundane, enabling people to concentrate on more productive and creative things [1] . This digital infrastructure puts sensors on everything (animate and inanimate), connects the sensors, think about what the things are saying, analyzes the data generated by the things to create a knowledge-base, and finally makes predictions or takes action based on that information [2] . In this way, it produces a new value in the form of time which is the positive aspect. On the downside, this increased connectivity era implies that an automated system handles both our safety and non-safety critical data and actions, and a breach in the intended behavior of the connected devices could prove catastrophic as they manage our daily activities from medicine to autonomous vehicles avionics and power systems. Hence, the need for an online anomaly model that can be integrated into these devices to monitor the conformity of the behavior The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Khalid Aamir.
of the devices with the prescribed operational standards. When the behavior of the devices and applications are wellcharacterized, then the state transition checks espoused by Sumner and Zhang [3] , Li et al. [4] [3] , [4] can be applied to detect the anomalies. However, there are two challenges associated with the tools in this data and connectivity explosion age; a) it is daunting to define all the possible states of the tuples associated with a particular process running in the embedded system because of the increasing complexity of tasks performed by these processes. b) the increasing complexity of the functions [2] performed by these cyber-physical embedded systems demands a high level of dynamism which makes the use of static state transition analysis untenable. Therefore, we propose a dynamic anomaly detection scheme that exploits the temporal information in the system call execution sequences to detect anomalies using a deep recursive attentive model (DReAM) .
DReAM processes the traces as sequential tuples and takes into account the temporal drift by building a profile that can create both short and long-term contexts of the sequences of the system calls. The use of the LSTM [5] cells and contextbased attention layer provides medium to short-term contexts while the incorporation of the feedback input from the attention layer creates a long-range dependency between the present and past inputs to the model. This dynamic approach enables us to target both identified and unseen anomalies and deepens the understanding of the execution contexts of the kernel events horizontally and vertically. The choice of LSTM stems from its configuration which favors the processing of sequential data using recursive context to capture relationships amongst the inputs. Because order and time are cardinal properties of the input sequences, LSTM became a natural choice because of its ability to capture relationships in this kind of input. DReAM employs the concept of transfer learning as we start with an unsupervised model architecture and use the knowledge from the unsupervised learning phase to create a fast supervised classifier to detect when an anomaly has occurred. The unsupervised phase of the model uses only the traces from the normal operating states while the supervised part makes use of a fraction of anomalous data and the standard profile data. While an outright supervised learning model is an option, we use the unsupervised learning model because of the following: a) the dataset of process profiles contain information about the behavior of the process under operating circumstances and does not cover all design scenarios. Therefore, generating a supervised learning classifier based on the available dataset is tantamount to working with a strong and wrong assumption that the available dataset captures the complete design states. b) even when the available dataset captures sufficient design conditions, the safetycritical roles that these embedded systems perform imply that there is always a high degree of class in-balance in the dataset used to create a supervised learning classifier. This situation leads to a biased model that hardly generalizes. Therefore, our unsupervised learning model instead uses a closed-world approach to err on the side of caution by labeling as anomalous, everything, that does not conform to a standard profile. This technique ensures that we eliminate the tendency to assume that only the anomalies learned in a supervised learning classifier applied directly on the dataset exist on the system. To tackle the class in-balance that is prevalent with this type of situation, our unsupervised learning model serves as a filter by giving us a measure of confidence during the sequence reconstruction process. Therefore, with markedly different probabilities generated when both the standard and anomalous sequences pass through the unsupervised model, we do not need a massive amount of data to train the supervised learning classifier as it consumes the output of the unsupervised learning model. Hence, the chasm in the class in-balance can be reduced resulting in a model that generalizes better. Some statistical methods that use exponential weighted moving average [6] or cumulative sum [7] can be useful, but their effectiveness is limited to the traces where there is no randomness. Trace tuples from the kernel layer containing interrupts make predictability with [6] , [7] ineffective. Also, anomaly detection models based on entropy like [8] does not fit this kind of analysis because it relies on volume to detect an anomaly rather than the temporal information conveyed by the tuples. Also, the variants of the vector space models used in [9] - [11] cannot be used for online anomaly detection because it performs classification based on a large buffer of the traces.
To facilitate the capture of long and short-term temporal dependencies, we use the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network [5] which its variants have been used in various tasks to demonstrate its effectiveness in capturing complex non-linear relationships that exist in a sequence. Therefore, the LSTM network learns the granular temporal relationships amongst kernel event streams of the present input while the attention layer determines in small details, the fine-grained relationships that exists amongst the tuples. This strategy helps to filter out the effect of the randomness prevalent in kernel event logs as a result of hardware interrupts. Our anomaly model uses a context-aware variant of the attention mechanism which does three functions; a) within tuples in a window under consideration, it improves the target tuple prediction accuracy by diminishing the effect of unessential source inputs for any target output. b) it narrows the dimension of the hidden state output of the LSTM and introduces flexibility in handling the size of the output vector. c) between predictions, the attention layer controls the influence of the previous output on the next target by presenting its context information as a part of the present input for the next target. So, this helps to answer the why question in the computation of the prediction by giving us a view of the features that influence each output as demonstrated in [12] . The logic in our reasoning is that just like natural language, each tuple has different contexts based on usage and the effect of the present tuple V t on next prediction V t+1 should come from a more in-depth and more extended context than just the current attention vector Z t . Therefore, in furtherance of the idea espoused by [13] in their Hierarchical Attention-based Anomaly Detection model called HAbAD, we introduce a new model architecture that is more robust to the incidents of false positives. Technically, DReAM is different from the model of HAbAD based on how the context vector is constructed and used in both the attention layer and next target prediction and this is one of the principal technical contributions of the work. Also, we increase the range of the experiments to validate the performance of DReAM with a base model that has no attention layer as well as with other models that have used the same dataset for validation.
The primary target of the work is system logs from operating systems like kernel traces or system calls. To handle bias in the model, we train the model only with attributes that cut across the different formats emitted by the different kinds of operating systems for the layer under consideration. Example of the characteristics of system calls sequence is open −→ mmap −→ read −→ close and these are used as features to train the model and get the classifier for this scenario. Therefore, we state the problem as thus: given logs obtained during the normal operation of a system, is it possible to create a model that uses the information solely from normal behavior to characterize the standard and deviant behaviors in the system logs? To answer the question posed above, we propose the model designed using LSTM networks with attention to detect anomalies in log sequences. In summary, our contributions are: a) we present a deep context-aware architecture for anomaly detection in semi-structured sequences with bias to system calls or kernel events. b) we demonstrate the significance of using the context-based attention layer to provide rich meanings that help to identify the nonlinear high dimensional associations inherent in system logs sequences.
To ease the comprehension of the work, we have divided the rest of the work into the following sections; Section II highlights the related work in this domain. Section III explains the scope, assumptions and limitations of the model while Section IV discusses the technical details of our DReAM. And Section V details our experimental setup and implementations as well as the description of the dataset used for the validation of the model. In Section VI, we discuss the results and compare with similar works on the same dataset. Finally, we conclude the work with an insight into our future research directions in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In both intrusion and anomaly detection systems, two strategies have been adopted [14] . The first method depends on the signatures of known anomalies to construct a signature database. Consequently, filtering of incoming messages is done by allowing only messages which do not match any pattern in the database to go through. Garcia-Teodoro et al. [15] detail this approach very well. The obvious limitation of this method is that zero-day vulnerabilities cannot be detected as it only searches for known signatures. On the other hand, Ezeme et al. [9] , Xu et al. [10] , Du et al. [16] , Yu et al. [17] use the second approach which involves the construction of a model to target both seen and unseen anomalies. The core principle of these approaches consists of the extraction of features from the operational profile of the system to construct models which can differentiate normal and anomalous behavior. While it is versatile regarding its threat target coverage, its performance comes at the cost of having a higher false positive than the signature-based methods.
In [9] , a vector space model is used with dendrograms to construct a threshold to distinguish different operational states from the normal states with excellent results but it is solely an offline based classifier, and scalability will be complicated because it consumes the whole observed sequences before making a decision. Yoon et al. [11] also have a vector space model based anomaly model that detects when processes deviate from their standard profiles. Again, this depends on observing system calls of processes over a long window before a decision is made and is therefore suitable for offline processing. Du et al. [16] built an anomaly detection framework called Deeplog using two layers of LSTM networks and a workflow construction approach for each key in the log for diagnostics. This Deeplog model uses same LSTM cells like ours, but there is no notion of attention layer in the framework. Also, Gu et al. [8] used the statistical metric of entropy to implement an anomaly detection model for network logs but this type of anomaly model is best suited for cases where the volume of logs determine if an anomaly has occurred as obtainable in denial of service attack. In [18] , a real-time systems anomaly detection model is designed using the principle of inter-arrival curves to detect anomalous traces in a log sequence. However, this inter-arrival curve-based model works offline because it requires a large number of logs before it computes the curves. Reference [10] designed a vector space model to mine console logs for anomalies and [4] used an optimization method of minimum debugging frontier sets to create a model for detection of errors/faults in software execution. Finally, in [19] , an attention-based recurrent model uses system logs for anomaly detection. While this model is similar to our model in terms of scope and concept, the approach in the model design is different. We differ in terms of overall model architecture and definition of the feedback context vector.
III. SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
DReAM works by creating an operational boundary of the process or application it is monitoring. And because embedded systems are bespoke, we assume that the model is profiling a single application that does repetitive tasks using defined routines. A couple of these applications that are networked together but resides in independent platforms form an IoT or IoE. Hence, whether the model is deployed in an IoE network or to monitor processes in a micro-kernel based operating systems like QNX Neutrino, DReAM is suitable for such as it is distributed in nature. Therefore, we discuss the limitations, assumption and target anomalous scenarios we consider in this work.
A. WHY SYSTEM CALLS
System calls represent the control flow of an application or a process. Our motivation for using system calls stems from the fact that unlike other intrusive approaches that use function arguments and return values to gauge the performance of the application, system calls are not intrusive and still capture the control flow of the application. Also, while plausibility check approaches that use the source code information to check for anomalies are function-based, the use of system calls gives information about the interaction of the application with other components of the system like another application or process, drivers, hardware, and memory. Therefore, the scope of system calls-based anomaly models is broader than the intrusive anomaly models which are function-based.
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Kernel events are a finite set of routines which are invoked by tasks scheduled by the operating system. The order and type of events vary from one application to the order. The table in Fig. 1 shows a snapshot of the kernel events from QNX RTOS with some of the attributes(timestamps, class, events, process name) shown. The events are sequential, and there is a temporal and local relationship that exists amongst the events within a snapshot. In Fig. 1 , the REC_PULSE event in row 6 has a cause and effect relationship with SND_PULSE_EXE event of row 2. As argued in [11] , the temporal relationships amongst these kernel events can be long especially for non-asynchronous processes running in a micro-kernel architecture. Some sequential-based machine learning models can efficiently learn these temporal relationships, but it will require a very long sequence as an input. However, if a malicious block of code execution generates sequences with a similar order used in building the profile as explained in Section III-D, the sequence-based scheme will fail to detect the anomaly, and this is the main weakness of DReAM. On the other hand, DReAM is flexible to handle both long and short sequences as input; hence, it scales well without degrading the results. This flexibility enables users to adjust the speed of the model when there is sufficient knowledge of the appropriate input length that captures the execution context of the application or process.
C. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Definitions:
We provide the definitions of some of the terms we will often mention in Section IV to aid the understanding of the content projected by the design.
• A feature refers to a unique variable resulting from the union of the class 1 and the event attributes of the traces.
• class ∪ event as a feature is considered significant for this modeling because it reflects the control flow of the process that generates the kernel events and this, in turn, determine the operation of the embedded system or the application interacts with other components of the system or IoE.
• An anomaly refers to a deviation from the defined routine of the application. This variance from the expected action can be as a result a deliberate or involuntary action of the application, and the kernel events collected during this fault/error is called an anomalous trace. Assumptions: Here, we state the assumptions we consider in designing DReAM. a) We assume that the embedded system is well defined and that the control flow can be exhausted during training. Because embedded applications tasks are mostly repetitious, this assumption is easily met.
b)
We also assume that an error or insertion of malicious code will not result in null events at the kernel. i.e., execution of malicious codes/errors should create events in the kernel. This is a necessary condition because if the malicious code/error do not generate kernel events, then DReAM cannot detect the anomaly. c) The location of the data collected for building the profile is assumed secure, and the tasks that generate the events are considered to adhere to the normal operational profile. Therefore, we do not consider a situation in which the logging tool or buffer for holding the snapshot is compromised.
D. TARGET ANOMALOUS SCENARIOS
In formulating the target anomalies of DReAM, Fig. 2 is used for our illustration. In Fig. 2 , the blocks start_rotors(), set_cordinate(), fly() and deliver_load() depict a complete execution flow of the normal operational profile scenario of a UAV application used for delivery of goods. The kernel events resulting from the execution of start_rotors() −→ set_cordinate() −→ fly() −→ deliver_load() marks one complete normal operational cycle logs. Now, if there is an insertion of a malicious code modify_cordinate() 2 into the sequence of the execution as depicted in Fig. 2 , one of four possibilities will occur in terms of how the malicious code affects the overall profile of the kernel events when the tasks complete one cycle of execution. The outcomes are illustrated in Fig. 2 and explained next: Fig. 2 could be as a result of hardware failures, glitches in software or intentional hijack of the embedded application by an intruder but our threat model does not cover how that block of code got injected in the application.
IV. ARCHITECTURE OF DReAM
In the following subsections, we describe the working details of DReAM design and the reasoning behind the architectural decisions we made. The simplified diagram of Fig. 3 shows the complete model design for one timestep. The unrolling of the network computes the prediction for subsequent timesteps. 
A. LOG PREPROCESSING
As highlighted in Section I, kernel traces have many attributes, and the rendering varies from one platform to the other. However, some of the attributes are either not generic enough or contain lots of null values. Therefore, our feature extraction module reduces bias in the model by focusing on attributes that are common in kernel traces across platforms. The events (class ∪ events in QNX) stand out as our choice in the feature space. In Algorithm 1, we have stepped through the process of extracting a feature for any raw trace received by the algorithm. 
B. MERGE LAYER
Our hypothesis is based on creating a deep execution context via a recursive input from the attention layer. Since the attention layer has a learned weight, it means that its output which is used to create the context C contains information of multiple previous inputs, and feeding it along with the present input either reinforces a standard profile or weakens the prediction accuracy which will indicate the presence of an anomaly. Therefore, (1) describes our approach of merging the recursive input C i with the present input X i .
Finally, we reverse the source sequence to create short-term dependencies in the learning process as discussed in [20] .
C. ENCODER LAYER
Our choice of LSTM cells in this layer stems from the fact that it is designed primarily for time-series data and its recursive nature helps to propagate temporal information across so many timesteps infinitely in theory. However, we recognize that in practice, there is a limit to how far behind it can propagate the errors before the vanishing gradient problem discussed in [21] sets in. Hence, our idea to augment it with a recursive context to improve the learnability over a long span of time. We feed the merge layer vector v ∈ R n to the encoder layer. Different kinds of LSTM configuration can be used, but we use the LSTM units described in [5] to create our layer. This layer's output is described mathematically in (2) where is a nonlinear function representing the LSTM cell, and b is the bias vector.
Attention layers come in broadly two flavors: soft and hard attention. The soft-attention uses weighted outputs of the input to attend while hard-attention randomly selects a subset of the input to attend. Each has its advantage and disadvantages, but we focus on the soft-attention method in this work. We sacrifice the efficiency of computation by using the weighted sum of all source inputs, as this helps the model to learn efficiently using backpropagation with gradient descent during training. Differing from [22] that uses memory to create context, we add a query weight W q that is learned during training to ensure that each tuple is not attended to by just its occurrence in the present input sequence only but also based on its context throughout the training period. This query performs the similar role as the term-frequency inverse document frequency used to weigh the occurrence of tuples in the vector space model. 
This correlation vector ((3)) represents the effect of each input based on the present. Hence, we multiply it with the query vector W q which has the global knowledge of each input tuple in the present input sequence to provide deep horizontally spanning inputs for the inference process as shown in (4). This vector is then passed through a softmax layer to generate s i in (5) . This normalized values is scaled by the input vectors h i and summed to generate the attention vector Z i in (6).
E. FULLY CONNECTED (FC) LAYER
Our FC layer is a simple dense layer with same number of units as there are unique features in the input sequences. The output of this layer is given in (7) where Z i , W z and b z are the attention layer output, the layer weight and the bias respectively.
The y i is then passed through a softmax layer to produce the predicted target kernel event or system call.
F. ERROR ESTIMATOR AND ANOMALY DETECTOR
Error Estimator: Given x ∈ Z p which serves as the input and target sequences, we aim to regenerate the sequence at the output by creating x ∈ Z p . Therefore, the perfect result is when x k ≡ x k but this is hardly feasible because of the high randomness caused by interrupts and other events in the traces. Hence, when we perform f : x → x given x as the ground truths, the deviation d = | x − x | is the difference between the ground truth and the predicted value for the given sequence. This deviation becomes the prediction error values which we process further to decide if an anomaly has occurred or not.
where; h > 0 is the bandwidth φ is the standard normal density function Anomaly Detection: Therefore, in keeping with the closed-world approach, we only examine the error values returned by the standard evaluation dataset V j where j refers to the scenario under consideration. The deviations
.., d |V j | from the validation dataset form an independent and identically distributed random variables which are used to generate the probability density function (PDF) ρ of the errors in a non-parametric way by fitting it to a kernel density estimator (kde). We use the normally distributed kernel which is given mathematically in (8). When we predict the ρ of both the typical and atypical sequences using the kernel, it generates ρ values in which there is a sharp contrast between the ρ values of the normal and anomalous sequences as seen in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 is a snapshot of the ρ values from both the normal and anomalous sequences along with the manually set threshold value ρ τ (the red horizontal line). If there is a high imbalance in the dataset categories, one option is to determine the value of ρ τ by visually inspecting the boundaries between the ρ values from the normal and anomalous sequences during training. Then, during testing, a sequence is anomalous if ρ < ρ τ . The drawback of this approach is that it is time-consuming and subject to inefficiencies as the boundary between the two classes may be fuzzy sometimes. The other option used by the authors in Reference [23] is the determination of the ρ τ by choosing the value that maximizes the F β using the validation dataset. And a sequence is labeled anomalous if ρ > ρ τ . The obvious drawback of this approach is that the hyper-parameters like the β, are set by the heuristic method.
In our design, we use the knowledge gathered up to this step to convert the model to a supervised learning model. We build the model by training a k-nearest neighbor (KNN) classifier with the ρ values from the validation data (negative class) and a fraction of the anomalous data (positive class). This model removes the time-consuming and error-prone process of setting a threshold value by the heuristic method. It also avoids the trial and error process of selecting the hyperparameters for any maximization function.
G. ONLINE MODEL UPDATE
An online model is not expected to stop working to retrain the model when there is a need for an update. In DReAM, we have a passive feedback mechanism which runs an update on the model if the false positive or false negative rate increases beyond an administrator's set limit. Firstly, to update the neural network predictor; we utilize the TensorFlow API called train_on_batch to make a single pass of the batch of the input that was noticed to have caused a significant deviation on the accuracy of the model. This API updates the model weight without retraining the model. For the online update of the knn classifier, we are mindful of the fact that the knn graph has to be limited to avoid overwhelming the memory. Therefore, we use the concept of 'freshness' to ensure that the newly arrived data from the updated recurrent neural network predictor displaces the oldest living portion of the data used to train the classifier, and the update method highlighted in [24] is used to update the knn graph.
V. DATASET AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To evaluate the performance of DReAM, we have simulated an anomaly detection process using the model of Fig. 3 on a real dataset generated from a UAV application running on a QNX Neutrino embedded operating system. Also, a benchmark model that uses the same parameters as the model of Fig. 3 but without the attention layer and the context input is used to validate the contribution of the attention layer and the context we derive from it in the model architecture. The sub-sections below give further details of the dataset and the experimental setup. In the experiment, we stream the dataset to mimic an online scenario because of the complexity and consequences of creating a real anomalous scenario in an operating system while in operation.
A. DATASET
In the embedded operating system traces' experiment, we utilize the dataset generated by the authors in Reference [25] to execute our experiments. The data is logged from a qnx rtos deployed on a UAV platform. Four experimental situations exist, and each has its separate kernel event logs. The scenarios are: full-while, fifo-ls, hilRF-InFin, and sporadic and the data is organized accordingly. Each category has three subfolders called train, clean and anomalous. The train sub-folder depicts the normal behavior of the system, the clean sub-folder is the validation data from the train sub-folder while the anomalous sub-folder is the traces depicting the deviation from the standard system behavior when operational. In our case, we split the train folder data into further training and validation data. Hence, each experimental scenario now has normal training data T i , normal validation data V i , normal test data from the clean folder S i , and the anomalous data A i , where i refers to the different scenarios in the experiment. We show the number of extracted features per folder for each scenario in Table 1 bearing in mind that T i ∪ V i constitute the training traces, and column four of Table 1 refers to all the features (not unique) extracted using Algorithm 1. The traces are logged using QNX tracelogger event count setting instead of duration; hence, each trace has 50000 samples. According to Salem et al. [18] , the hilRf-InFin scenario corresponds to the default system setting while full-while scenario refers to generating fictitious tasks via a while loop to waste CPU resources by competing for the same CPU resource with the standard tasks running the UAV. The fifo-ls and sporadic situations derive their names from the scheduling algorithms in the operating system and are identified by the corresponding scheduling algorithm used in each experiment.
B. EXPERIMENTS
The flow of our experiment is as depicted in Fig. 3 . The trace logs are processed with Algorithm 1 and the input features are extracted. This step creates a univariate sequence of features. We create input and output windows using the univariate features. The output window reflects the lookahead length while the input window is determined via heuristic to provide a balance between temporal information capture and computing complexity.The ratio of the input sequence length to the output sequence length is represented by = θ in /θ out . Therefore, i is the input-output window ratio for lookahead length i. As we stated in the Section III, we assume that the profiles depicting the standard operational behavior is devoid of anomalies. The base The length of the input sequence is varied to test the versatility of the model in learning of temporal relationships that exist within both short and long sequences. We use only the T i and V i data for training and validation respectively as they are free of anomalies. Given F as the set of all the features in the embedded operating system traces, F N ⊆ F and F A ⊆ F are valid where F N and F A refer to the set of the features of the normal and anomalous sequences respectively. Also, F N ∩ F A D ∅, hence our choice of using the closed-world model which removes the strong assumption that the available atypical traces capture all the possible anomalies that can be present in the embedded system.
The validation errors are passed to the error estimator block to fit a kde. The kde kernel generates the probability density function ρ N for the normal sequence error value and ρ A for the anomalous sequence error values. We settle for using the error values to reduce the incidents of false positives and false negatives as we are interested in understanding the profile of the application over time and not just instant future event prediction. This idea is premised on the belief that a single kernel event error can hardly affect the performance of the process or application but a couple of wrong or illegal kernel events over time can form a payload which can be used to wreak damage on the application. With the high number of anomalous samples as seen in Table 1 , we use the ρ values of V i and a fraction of the ρ values from the A i to train the KNN algorithm in the anomaly detection block. We determine the optimal number of neighbors by performing k-fold cross-validation on the ρ values. k is 5 in all our experiments. To demonstrate the efficacy of this method, we show the decision boundaries set by the F β minimization function and that of the KNN model in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b respectively for the sporadic scenario sequences. As evident from 
VI. RESULTS AND MODEL ANALYSIS
We implement four different models corresponding to the different kinds of sequences in the dataset, and we run the simulations to generate the results in Table 2 . The decision boundaries of the four scenarios appear similar but for want of space, we show that of the, full, sporadic and fifo decision boundaries in Fig. 7, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 respectively. Using the anomaly detector module of these models, we generate the results for the accuracy of the DReAM models and compared with the same architecture using the base models that do neither contain the attention layer nor the recursive context input. The n of the last column represents the number of neighbors used to make a detection decision in the anomaly detector module of the model. The anomalous sequences are tagged a Positive class and the normal sequences are tagged a Negative class and the measure of closeness is the Minkowski distance metric.
In this design, our goals are: a) achieve high recall notably for the positive class to reduce false negative (FN) which may be harmful to the operation of the embedded system especially the critical safety systems. b) mitigate false positive (FP) by achieving high precision to avoid the resource consuming process of halting the operation of an embedded system and investigating the FP. 
A. BASE MODEL VS ATTENTION-BASED MODEL
Early stopping and dynamic learning rate are used during training to control the number of training epochs and improve the performance of the adam [26] optimization scheme that was used during training. In Table 2 , two patterns emerge: a) DReAM consistently outperforms the base model in every i . b) there is decreasing accuracy as we increase i in . These patterns conform with our postulation that the attention layer and the recursive input of DReAM impact positively on the model performance. Also, with a fixed input window, θ in , the decreasing accuracy with increasing θ out is expected as the temporal information needed for longer sequence generation is restricted.
B. DREAM VS OTHER MODELS
Ezeme et al. [9] , [13] , Salem et al. [18] [9], [13] , [18] have used the same dataset for model validation. Although [9] , [18] models are offline-based models and do not take temporal relationships in the sequence of events into account, we compare DReAM with theirs as those are the works we know targeting anomaly detection in an embedded system via trace analysis that have used the same dataset for model validation. We also include the HAbAD model of [13] in the comparison as this work builds on its architecture to reduce the high incidences of the false positive rate recorded in the HAbAD model. Table 3 displays the true and false positive rates from those works compared to DReAM. Unlike the models of [9] , [18] that consider the full length of the trace anomalous if any part of the trace is anomalous, DReAM presents the opportunity of localizing the anomaly in a stream of events. However, for the sake of comparison, if anomaly is detected in major parts of the trace of Table 1 , we label the whole trace as anomalous. But the major difference between DReAM and the models of [9] , [18] is in the length of the input sequence required to make an inference. While [9] , [18] require a long sequence of events observed over a span of time, DReAM and HAbAD can take a short sequence of input as small as ten and make a prediction on whether it contains anomalies. As seen from Table 3 , DReAM outperforms the [18] 's model regarding the true positive rate. However, [9] 's sporadic model beat the DReAM's true positive rate. The true positive rate is significant because the anomalies have a positive tag. With regards to the false positive rate, the models of [9] , [18] perform better obviously because it requires a longer sequence to make an inference. However, this requirement for long input sequences limits the application of these [9] , [18] models to offline anomaly detection. Furthermore, while [9] , [18] models use quantitative variance as their underlying principle, DReAM uses the temporal ordering of the sequences as the underlying marker which means that DReAM and [9] , [18] target two different types of anomalies in the system. Finally, DReAM reduces the strain put on the embedded storage by consuming the sequences as they are streamed from the instrumented kernel but the models of [9] , [18] require a system with high capacity storage that can store the traces for offline processing. DReAM also has the advantage of deciding on both long and short sequences without seeing the complete sequence, e.g. if an anomaly requires 100 timesteps to execute the anomalous payload, DReAM requires as little as 5 − 10 timesteps to detect that there is an anomaly in the system while the models of [9] , [18] require traces comparable in length to the training sequences to make an inference.
Also, from Table 3 , we can see the impact of the improvement in the architecture between DReAM and HAbAD as manifest in their false positive rate numbers. We set out primarily to reduce the incidents of the false positives with a modification in the architecture of HAbAD because it takes time and resources to investigate a false positive especially in a critical infrastructure. We are able to improve the false positive rate by 25% , 50%, and 71% in the full, fifo, and sporadic scenarios respectively. [9] , [13] , [18] .
C. MODEL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Bearing in mind that the model can run both online and offline, we analyze the complexity of the DReAM concerning space and time. DReAM consists of two components which are the unsupervised recurrent neural network predictor and the supervised clustering classifier. Our test platform is a personal computer with four logical processors running Intel Core i5-6200U CPU clocked at 2.3 GHz and 2.4 Ghz on two cores. The complete model parameters and architecture require about 2.1 Mb storage and the personal computer has a primary memory capacity of 8 GB.
As for time complexity, we time the running of the model from the unsupervised predictor to the error estimator and knn classifier. The longest input length we test is 10, and it took the predictor an average of 3 milliseconds to make the prediction. The non-parametric kernel estimator took about 7 nanoseceonds to generate the probability density and the knn classifier takes an average of 0.1 millisececonds to make an anomaly decision. Overall, the end-to-end inference time for this model on this platform is about 3.107 milliseconds.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We propose the approach of characterizing the behavior of an embedded system via the online execution trace analysis using recurrent neural networks. The concept of using context-based attention layer to generate deep contexts as well as the significance of the attention network is explored. The aim is to analyze the traces sequentially to reflect how the sequences are generated. And because we assume that the kernel traces hold unbiased details of the system behavior, we use the kernel events to create a model capable of detecting anomalies in the embedded system. The detailed implementation is discussed, and the results confirm our hypothesis that because there is a finite set of features in the kernel which are shared by both the normal and anomalous traces, we can use a closed-world approach to build the model and detect anomalies. The results in Table 2 support our claim of detecting anomalies with the model, but we will keep improving the work to further bring down the incidents of false positives reported in Table 3 . Furthermore, we aim to implement the model in a real embedded operating system to measure the computational requirement of the model while in operation under different load conditions. Finally, temporal analysis that incorporates the timing analysis of the kernel events will be explored as we aim to make the model more dynamic and responsive to temporal fluctuations inherent in the operation of the embedded system. 
